 An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawarenessPierfrancesco Guarino Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, issue C, 257-288 Abstract: We introduce a novel framework to describe dynamic interactive reasoning in presence of unawareness. We extend the notion of conditional probability systems for this setting and we perform the construction of the corresponding canonical hierarchical structure, that is, the structure that contains all coherent infinite hierarchies of beliefs in presence of unawareness and conditioning events, which is an extension of the one constructed in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a). Relying on the existence of this object, we provide an epistemic characterization of Strong Rationalizability of Pearce (1984) as defined in Heifetz et al. (2013) to address the case of dynamic games with unawareness. The characterization is based on the notion of Strong Belief, introduced in the literature by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002). Keywords: Dynamic exogenous unawareness structure; Conditional probability systems; Canonical hierarchical structure; Dynamic games; Strong rationalizability; Strong belief (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:257-288 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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