Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
Battal Dogan and
M. Bumin Yenmez
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 366-373
Abstract:
The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools since 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is better for students when choice rules of schools are substitutable. If the choice rule of a school is not substitutable, then there exist student preferences such that at least one student strictly prefers the divided enrollment system to the unified enrollment system. Furthermore, we characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided enrollment system when choice rules of schools are substitutable.
Keywords: Market design; School choice; Unified enrollment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619301411
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago (2018) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:366-373
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.010
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().