Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago

Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is better for students when choice rules of schools are substitutable. Furthermore, we characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided system.

Keywords: Market design; school choice; unified enrollment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages.
Date: 2018-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/705

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