Details about Battal Doğan

Access statistics for papers by Battal Doğan.

Last updated 2024-03-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pdo391

Working Papers

2021

1. Mechanism Design Approach to School Choice: One versus Many
   Papers, arXiv.org

2020

2. Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students: Stability Comparisons in School Choice
   Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ View citations (1)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2020)
3. Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
   Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ View citations (2)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2020) View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association (2022) View citations (11) (2022)

2019

4. Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints
   Papers, arXiv.org
   Also in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie (2017) View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory (2021) View citations (1) (2021)

2018

5. Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application
   Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (19)
   See also Journal Article Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2018) View citations (14) (2018)
6. Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago
   Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2019) View citations (6) (2019)
7. When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?
   Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK View citations (9)
   See also Journal Article When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?, Economic Theory, Springer (2023) View citations (1) (2023)

2017

8. Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago
   Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (6)

2016

9. How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment
   Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (2017) (2017)

2015

10. Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice
    Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article Responsive affirmative action in school choice, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2016) View citations (9) (2016)

Journal Articles

2023

1. Choice with Affirmative Action
   Management Science, 2023, 69, (4), 2284-2296
2. When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
   Economic Theory, 2023, 76, (4), 1145-1173 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?, Bristol Economics Discussion Papers (2018) View citations (9) (2018)

2022

3. Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
   American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14, (4), 556-82 View citations (11)
   See also Working Paper Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, Cahiers de recherche (2020) View citations (2) (2020)

2021

4. Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
   Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, 23, (1), 172-196 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints, Papers (2019) (2019)
5. Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
   Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16, (4) View citations (5)
6. On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules
   Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021, 46, (3), 856-868

2020

7. Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism
   Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, 8, (1), 125-137

2019

8. Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 118, (C), 366-373 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago, Bristol Economics Discussion Papers (2018) View citations (3) (2018)

2018

9. A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 175, (C), 178-200 View citations (4)
10. Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, 79, (C), 140-156 View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie (2018) View citations (19) (2018)

2017

11. Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, 73, (C), 103-110 View citations (3)
12. How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment
    American Economic Review, 2017, 107, (4), 1362-64
    See also Working Paper How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie (2016) View citations (1) (2016)
13. Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46, (4), 991-1014 View citations (1)

2016

14. Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 95, (C), 47-58 View citations (10)
15. Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
    Economics Letters, 2016, 146, (C), 8-12 View citations (5)
16. Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 98, (C), 165-171
17. Responsive affirmative action in school choice
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 165, (C), 69-105 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie (2015) View citations (4) (2015)

2015

18. Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, 44, (2), 423-432 View citations (4)