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Details about Battal Doğan

Homepage:http://www.battaldogan.com
Workplace:School of Economics, University of Bristol, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Battal Doğan.

Last updated 2021-05-26. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pdo391


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Working Papers

2021

  1. Mechanism Design Approach to School Choice: One versus Many
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads

2020

  1. Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students: Stability Comparisons in School Choice
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2020) Downloads
  2. Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ Downloads
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2020) Downloads View citations (1)

2019

  1. Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads
    Also in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie (2017) Downloads View citations (2)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2021)

2018

  1. Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application
    Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Downloads View citations (15)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2018)
  2. Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago
    Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2019)
  3. When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?
    Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK Downloads View citations (6)

2017

  1. Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago
    Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Downloads View citations (6)

2016

  1. How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment
    Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2017)

2015

  1. Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice
    Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2016)

Journal Articles

2021

  1. Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, 23, (1), 172-196 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2019)

2020

  1. Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism
    Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, 8, (1), 125-137 Downloads

2019

  1. Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 118, (C), 366-373 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2018)

2018

  1. A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 175, (C), 178-200 Downloads View citations (3)
  2. Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, 79, (C), 140-156 Downloads View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper (2018)

2017

  1. Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, 73, (C), 103-110 Downloads View citations (2)
  2. How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment
    American Economic Review, 2017, 107, (4), 1362-64 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2016)
  3. Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46, (4), 991-1014 Downloads View citations (1)

2016

  1. Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 95, (C), 47-58 Downloads View citations (9)
  2. Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
    Economics Letters, 2016, 146, (C), 8-12 Downloads View citations (2)
  3. Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 98, (C), 165-171 Downloads
  4. Responsive affirmative action in school choice
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 165, (C), 69-105 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (2015)

2015

  1. Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, 44, (2), 423-432 Downloads View citations (2)
 
Page updated 2022-01-16