When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?

Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez

Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: We study multistage centralized assignments to allocate scarce resources based on priorities in the context of school choice. We characterize the capacity-priority profiles of schools under which an additional stage of assignment may improve student welfare when the deferred acceptance algorithm is used at each stage. If the capacity-priority profile is acyclic, then no student prefers any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of the 2-stage enrollment system to the truthful equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage enrolment system. If the capacity-priority profile is not acyclic, then an SPNE outcome of the 2-stage enrollment system may Pareto dominate the truthful equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage enrollment system.

Pages: 28 pages.
Date: 2018-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/704

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