When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?
Battal Dogan and
M. Bumin Yenmez ()
Bristol Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK
We study multistage centralized assignments to allocate scarce resources based on priorities in the context of school choice. We characterize the capacity-priority profiles of schools under which an additional stage of assignment may improve student welfare when the deferred acceptance algorithm is used at each stage. If the capacity-priority profile is acyclic, then no student prefers any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of the 2-stage enrollment system to the truthful equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage enrolment system. If the capacity-priority profile is not acyclic, then an SPNE outcome of the 2-stage enrollment system may Pareto dominate the truthful equilibrium outcome of the 1-stage enrollment system.
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