Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints

Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan and Kemal Yildiz

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.

Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.13237 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints (2021)
Working Paper: Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1910.13237

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