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Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application

Battal Dogan and Bettina Klaus ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 79, issue C, 140-156

Abstract: Which mechanism to use to allocate school seats to students still remains a question of hot debate. Meanwhile, immediate acceptance mechanisms remain popular in many school districts. We formalize desirable properties of mechanisms when respecting the relative rank of a school among the students’ preferences is crucial. We show that those properties, together with well-known desirable resource allocation properties, characterize immediate acceptance mechanisms. Moreover, we show that replacing one of the properties, consistency, with a weaker property, non-bossiness, leads to a characterization of a much larger class of mechanisms, which we call choice-based immediate acceptance mechanisms. It turns out that certain objectives that are not achievable with immediate acceptance mechanisms, such as affirmative action, can be achieved with a choice-based immediate acceptance mechanism.

Keywords: Affirmative action; Consistency; Favoring-higher-ranks; Immediate acceptance mechanism; Non-bossiness; Resource-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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