Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2026

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

From Elsevier
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Volume 124, issue C, 2026

The Walker–Groves–Ledyard mechanism: Improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability

Paul J. Healy and Renkun Yang

Final-offer arbitration with reference-dependent preferences

Shunsuke Hanato

Impartial observer theorem with ambiguity

Raphael Gomes de Oliveira

Cooperative games with unpaid players

Sylvain Béal, Léa Munich, Philippe Solal and Kevin Techer

Popularity in location games

Gaëtan Fournier and Marc Schröder

A theory of probabilistic economic equilibria

Juan Jacobo

Membership mechanism

Seung Han Yoo

k-boundedness, feasible communication structures, and the Myerson value

Takuto Kaneko, David Lowing and Satoshi Nakada

Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index

Qianqian Kong and Hans Peters

Waiting for others: Long delays in social learning

Luis Frones

Equilibria of large production economies with interdependent preferences: A role for the infinite dimensional Fatou’s lemma

Motoki Otsuka

Equity auctions with bidder moral hazard

Mingrui Gao, Xun Chen and Dazhong Wang

Welfare effects of integrating unbalanced matching markets

Behrang Kamali Shahdadi and Milad Mozafari-Vanani

Pareto improving taxes with non-separable externalities: A differentiable approach

Van-Quy Nguyen, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Elena L. del Mercato

Sharing opportunities under externalities

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan and Mathieu Faure

Strategic analysis of fair rank-minimizing mechanisms with agent refusal option

Yasunori Okumura

Psychological lock-in and institutional persistence: A mean-field model of confidence dynamics

Nicolò Bellanca

Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems

Changwoo Park

Connected incomplete preferences

Leandro Gorno and Alessandro T. Rivello

Volume 123, issue C, 2026

The maxmin value of repeated games with incomplete information on one side and tail-measurable payoffs

Gil Bar Castellon Koltun, Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan

On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization

Makoto Hagiwara, Goro Ochiai and Hirofumi Yamamura

Group obvious strategy-proofness: Definition and characterization

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme

Agreeing to disagree revisited

Shinya Sugiura

Uncertainty in discount rate and aggregation of time preferences

Tailong Li and Wei Ma

A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions

Matthew J. Robertson

Volume 122, issue C, 2026

Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: The use of two-stage mechanisms

Takashi Kunimoto and Cuiling Zhang

On steady-state money distributions and monetary policy: Smoothness in a matching model

Jefferson D.P. Bertolai and Nathan T. Machado

Nominal rigidities in both the intermediate goods sector and the final goods sector and equilibrium determinacy

Myunghyun Kim

Equilibrium selection in aggregative games with strategic complementarities

Ricardo Serrano-Padial

Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan and Antonio Penta

Endogenous entry and investment in an all-pay auction

Derek J. Clark and Tapas Kundu

Dynamic communication with trading commissions

Hargungeet Singh

Optimal contracts under general mixed constraints: Continuity, structure, and applications

Aggey Simons

Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Hiroki Shinozaki

Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley–Scarf economy

Ryo Kawasaki

AGV mechanism balances the budget with minimum total transfer variance

Toan Le

The pipeline externalities problem

Christian Trudeau and Edward C. Rosenthal

Sequential elimination contests with repechage

Zijia Wang

Information design and reputations in the frequent-interaction limit

Erik Lillethun

Learning paths to multi-sector equilibrium: Belief dynamics under uncertain returns to scale

Stefano Nasini, Rabia Nessah and Bertrand Wigniolle

Interdependent Bargains

Yihang Zhou and David Sibley

Volume 121, issue C, 2025

Compensated discrete choice and the Slutsky equation

John K. Dagsvik

A Single Relation Theory of Welfarist Social Evaluation

Robert Raschka

Ekici’s reclaim-proof allocations revisited

Qianfeng Tang and Zhan Zhu

Obvious representations

Lorenz Hartmann and Jean Baccelli

Prudence and higher-order risk attitudes in the rank-dependent utility model

Ruodu Wang and Qinyu Wu

Preference for mixture and local ambiguity reduction in nonconvex preferences

Youngsoo Heo

Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance

Kiyong Yun

Censored beliefs and wishful thinking

Jarrod Burgh and Emerson Melo

The tontine puzzle

An Chen, Alfred Müller and Manuel Rach

Design tools for all-pay contests: Aligning incentives and balancing the playing field

Rui Gao, Jingfeng Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou

Efficiency, sorting, and selection

Esteban Peralta

Choquet expected utility and never best choice

Christopher Kops, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

Hotelling competition with discrete consumers

Martin C. Byford

Some new characterizations of top trading cycles

Yajing Chen, Zhenhua Jiao, Chenfeng Zhang and Luosai Zhang

Expected multi-utility representations of preferences over lotteries

Paolo Leonetti