Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

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Volume 88, issue C, 2020

Pollution, mortality and time consistent abatement taxes pp. 1-15

Aditya Goenka, Saqib Jafarey and William Pouliot

Constrained no-regret learning pp. 16-24

Ye Du and Ehud Lehrer

A foundation for Pareto optimality pp. 25-30

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms pp. 31-41

Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen

Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game pp. 42-51

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

Weighted representative democracy pp. 52-63

Marcus Pivato and Arnold Soh

Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions pp. 64-71

Guillaume Carlier and Kelvin Shuangjian Zhang

Aggregate play and welfare in strategic interactions on networks pp. 72-86

Karan N. Chadha and Ankur A. Kulkarni

No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem pp. 87-97

Duygu Yengin and Youngsub Chun

Constrained inefficiency of competitive entrepreneurship pp. 98-103

Sakai Ando and Misaki Matsumura

Subjective expected utility with imperfect perception pp. 104-122

Marcus Pivato and Vassili Vergopoulos

Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns pp. 123-140

Jian Yang and Jianbin Li

Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies pp. 141-152

Daniel Lehmann

Intensity of preferences for bivariate risk apportionment pp. 153-160

David Crainich, Louis Eeckhoudt and Olivier Le Courtois

Closure and preferences pp. 161-166

Christopher Chambers, Alan Miller and M. Bumin Yenmez

Financial risk taking in the presence of correlated non-financial background risk pp. 167-179

W. Henry Chiu

Non-Archimedean preferences over countable lotteries pp. 180-186

Jeffrey Sanford Russell

Can everyone benefit from innovation? pp. 187-191

Christopher Chambers and Takashi Hayashi

Volume 87, issue C, 2020

Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem pp. 1-5

Shunya Noda

A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes pp. 6-14

Marina Núñez, Carlos Rafels and Francisco Robles

Random assignments of bundles pp. 15-30

Shurojit Chatterji and Peng Liu

Debt constraints and monetary policy pp. 31-42

Diemo Dietrich, Jong Shin and Mich Tvede

False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad pp. 43-55

Richmond Harbaugh and Ted To

Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules pp. 56-66

Swarnendu Chatterjee and Ton Storcken

Satisficing with a variable threshold pp. 67-76

Matthew Kovach and Levent Ülkü

Utilitarianism with and without expected utility pp. 77-113

David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola and Teruji Thomas

Graduate admission with financial support pp. 114-127

Mustafa Afacan

On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting pp. 128-133

Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar and Tal Patal

Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters pp. 134-141

Walter Bossert and Sususmu Cato

Hazard rate, stochastic choice and consideration sets pp. 142-150

Yusufcan Demirkan and Mert Kimya

A simplified approach to subjective expected utility pp. 151-160

Lorenzo Stanca

Volume 86, issue C, 2020

Non-stationary additive utility and time consistency pp. 1-14

Nicolas Drouhin

Pathwise smooth splittable congestion games and inefficiency pp. 15-23

Roberto Raimondo

Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice pp. 24-34

Srinivas Arigapudi

Simple fair division of a square pp. 35-40

Jerzy Legut

Tournament-stable equilibria pp. 41-51

Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni and Carlos Pimienta

Effects of foreign aid on the recipient country’s economic growth pp. 52-68

Ngoc-Sang Pham and Thi Kim Cuong Pham

Increasing risk: Dynamic mean-preserving spreads pp. 69-82

Jean-Louis Arcand, Max-Olivier Hongler and Daniele Rinaldo

Utility indifference pricing and the Aumann–Serrano performance index pp. 83-89

Jiro Hodoshima and Yoshio Miyahara

Volume 85, issue C, 2019

Dynamic contracts with random monitoring pp. 1-16

Andrei Barbos

The invariant distribution of wealth and employment status in a small open economy with precautionary savings pp. 17-37

Christian Bayer, Alan D. Rendall and Klaus Wälde

Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability pp. 38-45

Tim J. Boonen

Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games pp. 46-51

Haifeng Fu and Bin Wu

Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection pp. 52-59

Anastasios Dosis

Efficiency-based measures of inequality pp. 60-69

Costel Andonie, Christoph Kuzmics and Brian W. Rogers

Bidding collusion without passive updating pp. 70-77

Charles Zheng

An additive model of decision making under risk and ambiguity pp. 78-92

Ying He, James S. Dyer, John C. Butler and Jianmin Jia

The consumption–investment decision of a prospect theory household: A two-period model with an endogenous second period reference level pp. 93-108

Jaroslava Hlouskova, Ines Fortin and Panagiotis Tsigaris

On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods pp. 109-128

Matthew Gentry, Tatiana Komarova, Pasquale Schiraldi and Wiroy Shin

Volume 84, issue C, 2019

Walrasian equilibrium as limit of competitive equilibria without divisible goods pp. 1-8

Michael Florig and Jorge Rivera

Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions pp. 9-27

Agnieszka Rusinowska and Akylai Taalaibekova

Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach pp. 28-45

Felix-Benedikt Liebrich and Gregor Svindland

A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting pp. 46-55

Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken

A note on optimal allocation with costly verification pp. 56-62

Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner

Choice on the simplex domain pp. 63-72

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge pp. 73-82

Satoshi Fukuda

Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information pp. 83-93

Anuj Bhowmik, Francesca Centrone and Anna Martellotti

Some generalizations of Zhao’s theorem: Hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences pp. 94-100

Zhe Yang and George Xianzhi Yuan

The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap pp. 101-106

Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti

Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment pp. 107-116

Patrick Harless

Capital regulation and banking bubbles pp. 117-129

Claire Chevallier and Sarah El Joueidi

Equilibria in ordinal status games pp. 130-135

Nikolai Kukushkin

Crashing of efficient stochastic bubbles pp. 136-143

Aloisio Araujo, Juan Pablo Gama and Mario Rui Pascoa

Learning from ambiguous and misspecified models pp. 144-149

Massimo Marinacci and Filippo Massari

Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games pp. 150-165

Ratul Lahkar

Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow’s single-peakedness pp. 166-175

Arkadii Slinko

Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure pp. 176-194

Peng Liu and Huaxia Zeng

Mean-dispersion preferences with a specific dispersion function pp. 195-206

Manuel Nunez and Mark Schneider

A dynamic analysis of nash equilibria in search models with fiat money pp. 207-224

Federico Bonetto and Maurizio Iacopetta

Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model pp. 225-242

Subir Chattopadhyay and Malgorzata (Gosia) Mitka