Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

From Elsevier
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A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements: Siqi Song and Chi Zhang
Balancing inequality reduction against equality of liabilities in a taxation scheme: Satya R. Chakravarty and Palash Sarkar
Pricing negative externalities in social networks: Guopeng Li, Sijie Wang, Yifan Xiong and Feng Zhu
A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences: Łukasz Balbus, Wojciech Olszewski, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny
An economic theory of the Soviet system: Maxime Menuet and Antoine Parent
Group dominant networks and convexity: Christophe Bravard, Sudipta Sarangi and Hector Tzavellas
Bargaining-Equilibrium equivalence: Anuj Bhowmik and Sandipan Saha
Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models: Juan Carlos Carbajal and John Nachbar
Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems: Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori and Claudia Meo
Overreacting to a black box: Shohei Yanagita
Return expectations across the wealth distribution: Edouard Djeutem and Shaofeng Xu

Decision making under time pressure: Mengke Wang
Editorial: Andrés Carvajal
Factor substitution and economic growth in a Romer-type model with monopolistic competition: Manuel Gómez
Nash oligarchies: Shiran Rachmilevitch
Cycle conditions for “Luce rationality”: José Rodrigues-Neto, Matthew Ryan and James Taylor
Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem: Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh and Youngsub Chun
Pareto efficiency and financial fairness under limited expected loss constraint: Tak Wa Ng and Thai Nguyen
Equilibrium convergence in large games: Enxian Chen, Bin Wu and Hanping Xu
On progressive tax systems with heterogeneous preferences: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Why do migrants stay unexpectedly? Misperceptions and implications for integration: Marc Kaufmann, Joël Machado and Bertrand Verheyden
Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting: Bach Dong-Xuan and Xiangyu Qu
Economic growth with brown or green capital: Stefano Bosi, Cuong Le Van and Giang Phung
The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions: Weizhen Meng, Tuyue Chen and Jinqiang Yang

Intergenerational redistribution with endogenous constraints to household debt: Ilya Eryzhenskiy
How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests: Luis Santos-Pinto and Petros G. Sekeris
Cooperative games with diversity constraints: Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Mostapha Diss and Rodrigue Tido Takeng
How to build and solve continuous-time heterogeneous agents models in asset pricing? The martingale approach and the finite difference method: Hamilton Galindo Gil
Costly learning under ambiguity: Kemal Ozbek
Signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous rivals: Jorge Catepillán, Nicolás Figueroa and Jorge Lemus
A partial-state space model of unawareness: Wesley H. Holliday
Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games: Daehyun Kim and Chihiro Morooka
Quality and price in scoring auctions: Yu Awaya, Naoki Fujiwara and Marton Szabo

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped: Bas Dietzenbacher and Yuki Tamura
Equilibria in abstract economies with a continuum of agents with discontinuous and non-ordered preferences: Anuj Bhowmik and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice: Takashi Hayashi
Accessibility of Pareto optima: Bernard Cornet
Effects of wariness on economic growth in overlapping generations models: Hai Ha Pham and Ngoc-Sang Pham
Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules: Steven Kivinen
Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent: Debasis Mishra and Kolagani Paramahamsa
On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators: Satoshi Fukuda
Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach: Yukihiko Funaki and Marina Núñez
An overlapping-generations model with data-driven equilibrium behavior: Alexander Gorokhovsky and Anna Rubinchik
Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules: Hiroki Shinozaki
The social value of overreaction to information: Matteo Bizzarri and d’Arienzo, Daniele

NPV, IRR, PI, PP, and DPP: A unified view: Mikhail Sokolov
Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models: Andrés Carvajal
Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems: Françoise Forges, Frederic Koessler and Andrés Salamanca
General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency: Kirill Borissov, Mikhail Pakhnin and Ron Wendner
A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem: Guillaume Carlier, Xavier Dupuis, Jean Rochet and John Thanassoulis
The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals: Changyong Han, Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami
The role of information in auctions: Alp E. Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci
An even tighter bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem: Haoyu Wu and Ao Tang
Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games: Guangjing Yang and Hao Sun
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots: Françoise Forges and Indrajit Ray
Robust α-maxmin representations: Alain Chateauneuf, Xiangyu Qu, Caroline Ventura and Vassili Vergopoulos
Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types: Chia-Hui Chen, Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen
Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility: Hervé Crès, Itzhak Gilboa and Nicolas Vieille