Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

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Volume 84, issue C, 2019

Walrasian equilibrium as limit of competitive equilibria without divisible goods pp. 1-8

Michael Florig and Jorge Rivera

Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions pp. 9-27

Agnieszka Rusinowska and Akylai Taalaibekova

Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach pp. 28-45

Felix-Benedikt Liebrich and Gregor Svindland

A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting pp. 46-55

Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken

A note on optimal allocation with costly verification pp. 56-62

Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner

Choice on the simplex domain pp. 63-72

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge pp. 73-82

Satoshi Fukuda

Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information pp. 83-93

Anuj Bhowmik, Francesca Centrone and Anna Martellotti

Some generalizations of Zhao’s theorem: Hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences pp. 94-100

Zhe Yang and George Xianzhi Yuan

The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap pp. 101-106

Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti

Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment pp. 107-116

Patrick Harless

Capital regulation and banking bubbles pp. 117-129

Claire Chevallier and Sarah El Joueidi

Equilibria in ordinal status games pp. 130-135

Nikolai Kukushkin

Crashing of efficient stochastic bubbles pp. 136-143

Aloisio Araujo, Juan Pablo Gama and Mario Rui Pascoa

Learning from ambiguous and misspecified models pp. 144-149

Massimo Marinacci and Filippo Massari

Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games pp. 150-165

Ratul Lahkar

Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow’s single-peakedness pp. 166-175

Arkadii Slinko

Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure pp. 176-194

Peng Liu and Huaxia Zeng

Mean-dispersion preferences with a specific dispersion function pp. 195-206

Manuel Nunez and Mark Schneider

A dynamic analysis of nash equilibria in search models with fiat money pp. 207-224

Federico Bonetto and Maurizio Iacopetta

Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model pp. 225-242

Subir Chattopadhyay and Malgorzata (Gosia) Mitka

Volume 83, issue C, 2019

Equilibrium in production chains with multiple upstream partners pp. 1-10

Meng Yu and Junnan Zhang

Consensus in social networks: Revisited pp. 11-18

Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Paths to stability for overlapping group structures pp. 19-24

Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl and Vincent Vannetelbosch

The supermodularity of the tax competition game pp. 25-35

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

Multilateral index number systems for international price comparisons: Properties, existence and uniqueness pp. 36-47

Gholamreza Hajargasht and D.S. Prasada Rao

Ambiguity and endogenous discounting pp. 48-62

Antoine Bommier, Asen Kochov and François Le Grand

On the number of employed in the matching model pp. 63-69

Minoru Kitahara and Yasunori Okumura

What can catastrophic events tell us about sustainability? pp. 70-83

Can Mavi

SSB representation of preferences: Weakening of convexity assumptions pp. 84-88

Miroslav Pištěk

The love for children hypothesis and the multiplicity of fertility rates pp. 89-100

Paolo Melindi-Ghidi and Thomas Seegmuller

School choice with neighbors pp. 101-109

Umut Dur and Thomas Wiseman

One-step-ahead implementation pp. 110-126

Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi

Nonexistence of constrained efficient production plans pp. 127-136

Michael Zierhut

Volume 82, issue C, 2019

Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations pp. 1-30

Thirumulanathan D, Rajesh Sundaresan and Y. Narahari

On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting pp. 31-60

Thirumulanathan D, Rajesh Sundaresan and Y. Narahari

Revealed preference and the subjective state space hypothesis pp. 61-68

Fernando Payro Chew

The structure of useful topologies pp. 69-73

Gianni Bosi and Gerhard Herden

The curse of long horizons pp. 74-89

V. Bhaskar and George Mailath

Bargaining with learning pp. 90-97

Tanjim Hossain

Lipschitz recursive equilibrium with a minimal state space and heterogeneous agents pp. 98-111

Rodrigo Raad and Łukasz Woźny

Greater Arrow–Pratt (Absolute) risk aversion of higher orders pp. 112-124

Liqun Liu and Kit Pong Wong

Procedural rationality, asset heterogeneity and market selection pp. 125-149

Guillaume Coqueret and Bertrand Tavin

Growth and bubbles: Investing in human capital versus having children pp. 150-159

Xavier Raurich and Thomas Seegmuller

A nonparametric test of quasiconcave production function with variable returns to scale pp. 160-170

Sung-Ko Li

The finite horizon, undiscounted, durable goods monopoly problem with finitely many consumers pp. 171-183

Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan and Adrian Vetta

The hedgehog’s dilemma pp. 184-196

Alvaro Sandroni

Equilibrium existence in games: Slight single deviation property and Ky Fan minimax inequality pp. 197-201

Vincenzo Scalzo

Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition pp. 202-213

Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments pp. 214-226

Alejandro M. Manelli and Daniel Vincent

Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences pp. 227-246

Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett

Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments pp. 247-263

Takashi Kunimoto

An axiomatic characterization of the price–money message mechanism for economies with satiation pp. 264-271

Hiromi Murakami and Ken Urai

Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences pp. 272-284

Ning Chen and Mengling Li

A task-allocation problem pp. 285-290

Mustafa Afacan