Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

From Elsevier
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Irreducible economies and strongly connected graphs pp. 937-956: Ruth Baldry and Sayantan Ghosal
Induced families of choice probabilities pp. 957-973: G. Herden and A. Pallack
When to accept a sequence of gambles pp. 974-982: Ola Hammarlid
Trading bargaining weights pp. 983-993: U. Ervig and Claus-Jochen Haake
Dilatation monotonous Choquet integrals pp. 994-1006: Johannes Leitner
How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games pp. 1007-1029: Antoine Billot and Jacques Thisse
Discrete fixed point theorem reconsidered pp. 1030-1036: Takuya Iimura, Kazuo Murota and Akihisa Tamura
A remark on the fiscal theory of price determination pp. 1037-1052: Gaetano Bloise
A positional version of Arrow's theorem pp. 1053-1059: Antonio Quesada
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set pp. 1060-1068: Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types pp. 793-811: Francoise Forges and Frederic Koessler
Continuous lexicographic preferences pp. 812-825: Vicki Knoblauch
Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems pp. 826-843: G. Carlier and R.-A. Dana
An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy pp. 844-856: Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Debt contracts and cooperative improvements pp. 857-874: Stefan Krasa, Tridib Sharma and Anne P. Villamil
Increasing outer risk pp. 875-886: Carmen F. Menezes and X. Wang
Inefficiency of equilibria with incomplete markets pp. 887-897: Ryo Nagata
Representation of the core of convex measure games via Kantorovich potentials pp. 898-912: G. Carlier
Limiting Dictatorial rules pp. 913-935: Ricard Torres

Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance pp. 637-645: Lars Peter Østerdal
Rumours and markets pp. 646-664: Michael Kosfeld
Interdependent preferences with a continuum of agents pp. 665-686: Mitsunori Noguchi
Coasian equilibrium pp. 687-704: John Conley and Stefani C. Smith
Monotonic matching in search equilibrium pp. 705-721: Frederick H. Chen
Arbitrage and state price deflators in a general intertemporal framework pp. 722-734: Elyès Jouini, Clotilde Napp and Walter Schachermayer
On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games pp. 735-763: Dries Vermeulen and Mathijs Jansen
On core-Walras equivalence in Banach lattices pp. 764-792: K. Podczeck

Incomplete-market dynamics in a neoclassical production economy pp. 407-438: George-Marios Angeletos and Laurent Calvet
Endogenous collateral pp. 439-462: Aloisio Araujo, José Fajardo and Mario Pascoa
On the existence of approximated equilibria in discontinuous economies pp. 463-481: Philippe Bich
Rearrangement inequalities in non-convex insurance models pp. 483-503: G. Carlier and Rose-Anne Dana
Markovian equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets and public policy pp. 505-544: Manjira Datta, Leonard Mirman, Olivier Morand and Kevin Reffett
Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption pp. 545-556: Chiaki Hara
Sorting in risk-aversion and asset price volatility pp. 557-570: Helios Herrera
Do pure indivisibilities prevent core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely indivisible commodities only pp. 571-601: Tomoki Inoue
Generic determinacy of equilibria with local substitution pp. 603-616: Frank Riedel
Existence and regularity of equilibria in a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public good pp. 617-636: Antonio Villanacci and Ünal Zenginobuz

Revising preferences and choices pp. 229-251: Michael Freund
The women of Cairo: Equilibria in large anonymous games pp. 253-264: Matthias Blonski
Pareto efficiency with spatial rights pp. 265-283: Juan Perote-Pena and Ashley Piggins
Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method pp. 285-301: Michiel Keyzer and Cornelia van Wesenbeeck
Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models pp. 303-324: Thomas Mariotti, Martin Meier and Michele Piccione
Competitive equilibrium cycles with endogenous labor pp. 325-349: Stefano Bosi, Francesco Magris and Alain Venditti
Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem pp. 351-385: Iván Arribas and Amparo Urbano
Duality and consumption decisions under income and price risk pp. 387-405: Carmen F. Menezes, X. Wang and John P. Bigelow

Evolutionary finance: introduction to the special issue pp. 1-5: Thorsten Hens and Klaus Schenk-Hoppé
Evolutionary dynamics in markets with many trader types pp. 7-42: William Brock, Cars Hommes and Florian Wagener
Evolutionary stability of portfolio rules in incomplete markets pp. 43-66: Thorsten Hens and Klaus Schenk-Hoppé
The asset market game pp. 67-90: Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana Ania
Market selection when markets are incomplete pp. 91-104: Alvaro Sandroni
Market selection and survival of investment strategies pp. 105-122: Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens and Klaus Schenk-Hoppé
Equilibria in financial markets with heterogeneous agents: a probabilistic perspective pp. 123-155: Hans Follmer, Ulrich Horst and Alan Kirman
Is risk-aversion hereditary? pp. 157-168: Moshe Levy
Genetic learning as an explanation of stylized facts of foreign exchange markets pp. 169-196: Thomas Lux and Sascha Schornstein
Institutional architectures and behavioral ecologies in the dynamics of financial markets pp. 197-228: Giulio Bottazzi, Giovanni Dosi and Igor Rebesco