Economics at your fingertips  

A note on the Exclusion Principle

Paolo Bertoletti ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, vol. 44, issue 11, 1215-1218

Abstract: The Exclusion Principle [Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C.G., 1993. Rigging the lobbying process: an application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review 83, 289-294] asserts that, in an all-pay auction with fully informed participants, it might be profitable for the seller to exclude those bidders whose valuations are the largest. Menicucci [Menicucci, D., 2006. Banning bidders from all-pay auctions. Economic Theory 29, 89-94] shows that banning (ex ante symmetric) bidders can raise expected revenue also in a setting in which the seller regards valuations as identically and independently distributed. We prove that the latter occurrence cannot arise if valuations are distributed according to a monotonic hazard rate.

Keywords: All-pay; auctions; Exclusion; Principle; Monotonic; hazard; rate; Economic; theory; of; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A note on the Exclusion Principle (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2023-01-08
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:11:p:1215-1218