A note on the Exclusion Principle
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of fully-informed potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that it does not apply if the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as belonging to the class of identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate.
Keywords: all-pay auctions; Exclusion Principle; monotonic hazard rate; economic theory of lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: A note on the Exclusion Principle (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1085
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