Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

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Volume 77, issue C, 2018

Factor-specific technology choice pp. 1-14

Jakub Growiec

A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments pp. 15-24

Finn Christensen and Christopher R. Cornwell

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information pp. 25-31

Ville Korpela

A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing pp. 32-38

Jesse A. Schwartz and Quan Wen

Profit rates equalization and balanced growth in a multi-sector model of classical competition pp. 39-53

Roman Kiedrowski

A note on multiplicative uncertainty and shareholders’ unanimity pp. 54-58

Marc St-Pierre

Continuous SSB representation of preferences pp. 59-65

Miroslav Pištěk

Fractional group identification pp. 66-75

Wonki Cho and Chang Woo Park

Axioms for measuring utility on partial mixture sets pp. 76-86

O’Callaghan, Patrick H.

Risk externalities: When financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution pp. 87-100

Maria Arvaniti and Andrés Carvajal

Volume 76, issue C, 2018

Intertemporal equilibrium with heterogeneous agents, endogenous dividends and collateral constraints pp. 1-20

Stefano Bosi, Cuong Le Van and Ngoc-Sang Pham

On the (non-)differentiability of the optimal value function when the optimal solution is unique pp. 21-32

Daisuke Oyama and Tomoyuki Takenawa

English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders pp. 33-44

Audrey Hu, Steven Matthews and Liang Zou

A note on Ramsey pricing and the structure of preferences pp. 45-51

Paolo Bertoletti

Sender–receiver games with cooperation pp. 52-61

Francoise Forges and Ulrich Horst

Credit market imperfection, minimum investment requirement, and endogenous income inequality pp. 62-79

George Vachadze

On sunspot fluctuations in variable capacity utilization models pp. 80-94

Frédéric Dufourt, Alain Venditti and Rémi Vivès

Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with short-selling and ambiguity pp. 95-100

Thai Ha-Huy, Cuong Le Van and Cuong Tran-Viet

Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining pp. 101-112

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Security design with interim public information pp. 113-130

Andre Stenzel

Some generalizations of Kajii’s theorem to games with infinitely many players pp. 131-135

Zhe Yang

Volume 75, issue C, 2018

Alpha cores of games with nonatomic asymmetric information pp. 1-12

Mitsunori Noguchi

On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information pp. 13-18

Guilherme Carmona

Testing Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods pp. 19-30

Andrés Carvajal and Xinxi Song

Game-theoretic modeling of players’ ambiguities on external factors pp. 31-56

Jian Yang

Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options pp. 57-66

Wuqin Sun, Dazhong Wang and Yue Zhang

Unbounded returns and the possibility of credit rationing: A note on the Stiglitz–Weiss and Arnold–Riley models pp. 67-70

Hengheng Lu and Kang Rong

Preferences over all random variables: Incompatibility of convexity and continuity pp. 71-83

Hirbod Assa and Alexander Zimper

Power method tâtonnements for Cobb–Douglas economies pp. 84-92

V. Shikhman, Yu. Nesterov and Victor Ginsburgh

Equilibria in the CAPM with non-tradeable endowments pp. 93-107

Pablo Koch-Medina and Jan Wenzelburger

Essential equilibrium in normal-form games with perturbed actions and payoffs pp. 108-115

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Nathan Wohl

Receiver’s dilemma pp. 116-124

Hanjoon Jung

Financial bubbles and capital accumulation in altruistic economies pp. 125-139

Stefano Bosi, Thai Ha-Huy, Cuong Le Van, Cao-Tung Pham and Ngoc-Sang Pham

On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information pp. 140-149

Anastasios Dosis

Patience in repeated bargaining: Revisiting Muthoo (1999) pp. 150-153

Jan Zapal

Volume 74, issue C, 2018

Sticky prices in a dynamic network economy: A family of counterexamples pp. 1-20

Niels Anthonisen

Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results pp. 21-34

Jun Xiao

Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future pp. 35-45

Alexander Gorokhovsky and Anna Rubinchik

On growing through cycles: Matsuyama’s M-map and Li–Yorke chaos pp. 46-55

Liuchun Deng and M. Khan

A note on the invariance of the distribution of the maximum pp. 56-61

Mogens Fosgerau, Per Olov Lindberg, Lars-Göran Mattsson and Jörgen Weibull

Curvature and uniqueness of equilibrium pp. 62-67

Andrea Loi and Stefano Matta

Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games pp. 68-78

Nikolai Kukushkin

Margins on short sales and equilibrium price indeterminacy pp. 79-92

Chenghu Ma, Jianqiang Hu and Yifan Xu

Bargaining sets in finite economies pp. 93-98

Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

Sufficient conditions for weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity in mixed extensions of games pp. 99-107

Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore

Symmetric mechanism design pp. 108-118

Yaron Azrieli and Ritesh Jain

On aggregation and representative agent equilibria pp. 119-127

Robert Jarrow and Martin Larsson

Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations pp. 128-138

Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao

Volume 73, issue C, 2017

A topological approach to delay aversion pp. 1-12

Lorenzo Bastianello

Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents pp. 13-33

Bernardo Guimaraes and Ana Elisa Pereira

Learning by doing, endogenous discounting and economic development pp. 34-43

Stéphane Bouché

Existence of equilibrium on asset markets with a countably infinite number of states pp. 44-53

Thai Ha-Huy and Cuong Le Van

Core equivalence with differentiated commodities pp. 54-67

Michael Greinecker and Konrad Podczeck

The effects of dependent beliefs on endogenous leverage pp. 68-80

Matthew Hoelle

Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf’s theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores pp. 81-85

Zhe Yang

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs pp. 86-102

Antonio Tesoriere

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents pp. 103-110

Battal Dogan

Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers pp. 111-121

Martin Van der Linden

Perturbed utility and general equilibrium analysis pp. 122-131

Wei Ma

Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels pp. 132-141

Sander Heinsalu

Probabilistic intertemporal choice pp. 142-148

Pavlo R. Blavatskyy