Journal of Mathematical Economics
1974 - 2025
Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 74, issue C, 2018
- Sticky prices in a dynamic network economy: A family of counterexamples pp. 1-20

- Niels Anthonisen
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results pp. 21-34

- Jun Xiao
- Regularity of a general equilibrium in a model with infinite past and future pp. 35-45

- Alexander Gorokhovsky and Anna Rubinchik
- On growing through cycles: Matsuyama’s M-map and Li–Yorke chaos pp. 46-55

- Liuchun Deng and M. Khan
- A note on the invariance of the distribution of the maximum pp. 56-61

- Mogens Fosgerau, Per Olov Lindberg, Lars-Göran Mattsson and Jörgen Weibull
- Curvature and uniqueness of equilibrium pp. 62-67

- Andrea Loi and Stefano Matta
- Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games pp. 68-78

- Nikolai Kukushkin
- Margins on short sales and equilibrium price indeterminacy pp. 79-92

- Chenghu Ma, Jianqiang Hu and Yifan Xu
- Bargaining sets in finite economies pp. 93-98

- Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García
- Sufficient conditions for weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity in mixed extensions of games pp. 99-107

- Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore
- Symmetric mechanism design pp. 108-118

- Yaron Azrieli and Ritesh Jain
- On aggregation and representative agent equilibria pp. 119-127

- Robert Jarrow and Martin Larsson
- Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations pp. 128-138

- Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao
Volume 73, issue C, 2017
- A topological approach to delay aversion pp. 1-12

- Lorenzo Bastianello
- Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents pp. 13-33

- Bernardo Guimaraes and Ana Elisa Pereira
- Learning by doing, endogenous discounting and economic development pp. 34-43

- Stéphane Bouché
- Existence of equilibrium on asset markets with a countably infinite number of states pp. 44-53

- Thai Ha-Huy and Cuong Le Van
- Core equivalence with differentiated commodities pp. 54-67

- Michael Greinecker and Konrad Podczeck
- The effects of dependent beliefs on endogenous leverage pp. 68-80

- Matthew Hoelle
- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf’s theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores pp. 81-85

- Zhe Yang
- Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs pp. 86-102

- Antonio Tesoriere
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents pp. 103-110

- Battal Dogan
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers pp. 111-121

- Martin Van der Linden
- Perturbed utility and general equilibrium analysis pp. 122-131

- Wei Ma
- Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels pp. 132-141

- Sander Heinsalu
- Probabilistic intertemporal choice pp. 142-148

- Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
Volume 72, issue C, 2017
- Growth effects of annuities and government transfers in perpetual youth models pp. 1-6

- Yoshiyuki Miyoshi and Alexis Akira Toda
- Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements pp. 7-15

- Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah and Tarik Tazdaït
- When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful? pp. 16-24

- Mustafa Afacan and Umut Dur
- Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology pp. 25-35

- Jingfeng Lu, Bo Shen and Zhewei Wang
- Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games pp. 36-50

- Frank Riedel and Jan-Henrik Steg
- Epistemic democracy with correlated voters pp. 51-69

- Marcus Pivato
- How risky is a random process? pp. 70-81

- Sudhir A. Shah
- Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games pp. 82-87

- Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz
- Axioms for parametric continuity of utility when the topology is coarse pp. 88-94

- O’Callaghan, Patrick H.
- Price stickiness and markup variations in market games pp. 95-103

- Guo Chen, C. Gizem Korpeoglu and Stephen Spear
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem pp. 104-111

- Yasunori Okumura
- Will truth out?—An advisor’s quest to appear competent pp. 112-121

- Nicolas Klein and Tymofiy Mylovanov
- The composite iteration algorithm for finding efficient and financially fair risk-sharing rules pp. 122-133

- Jaroslav Pazdera, Johannes Schumacher and Bas J.M. Werker
- Impact of mortality reductions on years of schooling and expected lifetime labor supply pp. 134-144

- Zhipeng Cai and Sau-Him Paul Lau
- Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible pp. 145-153

- Michael Florig and Jorge Rivera
Volume 71, issue C, 2017
- Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: Silence is not golden pp. 1-13

- Lucie Ménager
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance pp. 14-19

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
- Utility of wealth with many indivisibilities pp. 20-27

- Markus Vasquez
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population pp. 28-35

- Sususmu Cato
- Cones with semi-interior points and equilibrium pp. 36-48

- Achille Basile, Maria Graziano, Maria Papadaki and Ioannis A. Polyrakis
- Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities pp. 49-62

- Pierre Boyer, Kai Konrad and Brian Roberson
- Context dependent beliefs pp. 63-73

- Evan Piermont
- Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks pp. 74-91

- Rui Li
- A strict expected multi-utility theorem pp. 92-95

- Leandro Gorno
- Asset price volatility and banks pp. 96-103

- Yu Zhang
- A dual approach to ambiguity aversion pp. 104-118

- Antoine Bommier
- Greater parametric downside risk aversion pp. 119-128

- Donald Keenan and Arthur Snow
- A note on “Evolution of Preferences” pp. 129-134

- Oliver Pardo
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction pp. 135-151

- Peio Zuazo-Garin
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