# Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information

*Haifeng Fu* and
*Haomiao Yu*

*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 2018, vol. 79, issue C, 18-26

**Abstract:**
In a Bayesian framework with public and private information that allows countably many players and infinitely many actions, we provide two sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria under the usual diffuseness and independence assumptions: every player has (i) a countable action set, or (ii) a relatively-diffuse strategy-relevant private information space conditioned on a public signal. Our results rely on the theory of distributions of correspondences with infinite-dimensional range and draw on notions of nowhere equivalence, relative saturation, and saturation.

**Keywords:** Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE); Pareto-undominated equilibrium; Socially-maximal equilibrium; Undominated equilibrium; Nowhere equivalence; Saturation (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 2018

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**Persistent link:** https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:18-26

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