Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 79, issue C, 57-64

Abstract: We consider a network game with local complementarities. A policymaker, aiming at minimizing or maximizing aggregate effort, contracts with a single agent on the network to trade effort change against transfer. The policymaker has to find the best agent and the optimal contract to offer. Our study shows that for all utilities with linear best-responses, it only takes two statistics about the position of each agent on the network to identify the key player: the Bonacich centrality and the self-loop centrality. We also characterize key players under linear quadratic utilities for various contractual arrangements.

Keywords: Key player; Network; Linear interaction; Incentives; Contract; Limited budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach (2018)
Working Paper: Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach (2018)
Working Paper: Targeting the Key Player: An Incentive-Based Approach (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:57-64

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.10.001

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