Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 64, issue C, 2016

Multicoalitional solutions pp. 1-10

Stéphane Gonzalez and Michel Grabisch

Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule pp. 11-22

Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley and Hatem Smaoui

Testable implications of the core in TU market games pp. 23-29

Yasushi Agatsuma

Risk aversion in a model of endogenous growth pp. 30-40

Christian Ghiglino and Nicole Tabasso

Partial knowledge restrictions on the two-stage threshold model of choice pp. 41-47

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti and Christopher Tyson

Precautionary saving demand and consumption dynamics with the spirit of capitalism and regime switching pp. 48-65

Haijun Wang

A market game with symmetric limit orders pp. 66-76

Mouhua Liao

Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: Theory and computational approximation pp. 77-98

Timothy Kam and Ronald Stauber

Continuous quasi-hyperbolic discounting pp. 99-106

Craig Webb

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees pp. 107-112

Ruth Ben-Yashar and Leif Danziger

Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games pp. 113-123

Boyu Zhang

Volume 63, issue C, 2016

An envelope approach to tournament design pp. 1-9

Christian Ewerhart

Expected utility theory and inner and outer measures of loss aversion pp. 10-20

G. Charles-Cadogan

Asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium under perfect and monopolistic competition pp. 21-26

Hirokazu Sakane

Non-paternalistic intergenerational altruism revisited pp. 27-33

Łukasz Balbus, Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak

Characterization of stationary preferences in a continuous time framework pp. 34-43

Kazuhiro Hara

Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations pp. 44-53

Takayuki Oishi, Mikio Nakayama, Toru Hokari and Yukihiko Funaki

Characterizing lexicographic preferences pp. 54-61

Henrik Petri and Mark Voorneveld

About delay aversion pp. 62-77

Lorenzo Bastianello and Alain Chateauneuf

Harsanyi’s theorem without the sure-thing principle: On the consistent aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences pp. 78-83

Stéphane Zuber

Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium pp. 84-92

Antoine Mandel and Herbert Gintis

Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds pp. 93-99

Tomoyuki Kamo and Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Risk aversion with two risks: A theoretical extension pp. 100-105

Jingyuan Li, Dongri Liu and Jianli Wang

Conditional preference orders and their numerical representations pp. 106-118

Samuel Drapeau and Asgar Jamneshan

Enrollment manipulations in school choice pp. 119-125

Mustafa Afacan

Relational contracts and the first-order approach pp. 126-130

Sunjoo Hwang

Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring pp. 131-138

Guilherme Carmona and Luís Carvalho

Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities pp. 139-146

Takashi Ui

Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies pp. 147-163

Roland Pongou and Roberto Serrano

A theory of stochastic choice under uncertainty pp. 164-173

Edi Karni and Zvi Safra

On time-consistent policy rules for heterogeneous discounting programs pp. 174-187

Jean-Pierre Drugeon and Bertrand Wigniolle

Volume 62, issue C, 2016

The transfer paradox in welfare space pp. 1-4

Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock and Victor Ginsburgh

Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games pp. 5-18

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Credit segmentation in general equilibrium pp. 19-27

Sebastián Cea and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Likelihood relations and stochastic preferences pp. 28-35

Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong

Locally robust contracts for moral hazard pp. 36-51

Gabriel Carroll and Delong Meng

When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions pp. 52-61

Vinicius Carrasco, Paulo Orenstein and Pablo Salgado

Stochastic stability in assignment problems pp. 62-74

Bettina Klaus and Jonathan Newton

Risk neutrality regions pp. 75-89

Yakar Kannai, Larry Selden, Minwook Kang and Xiao Wei

Volume 61, issue C, 2015

Menu-dependent self-control pp. 1-20

Jawwad Noor and Norio Takeoka

Decomposing random mechanisms pp. 21-33

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver

Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games pp. 34-57

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Kern

Potential games with incomplete preferences pp. 58-66

Jaeok Park

New conditions for the existence of Radner equilibrium with infinitely many states pp. 67-73

Bogdan Klishchuk

Centralized allocation in multiple markets pp. 74-85

Daniel Monte and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity pp. 86-95

Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Random scheduling with deadlines under dichotomous preferences pp. 96-103

İbrahim Barış Esmerok

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core pp. 104-110

László Kóczy

A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule pp. 111-118

Juan Vidal-Puga

“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity pp. 119-129

Adam Dominiak and Jean-Philippe Lefort

Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes pp. 130-138

Eric Kamwa and Vincent Merlin

Intertemporal choice with different short-term and long-term discount factors pp. 139-143

Pavlo Blavatskyy

Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output pp. 144-151

Josep Freixas and Cameron Parker

Similarity-based mistakes in choice pp. 152-156

Fernando Payro Chew and Levent Ülkü

A nonsmooth approach to envelope theorems pp. 157-165

Olivier Morand, Kevin Reffett and Suchismita Tarafdar

The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing pp. 166-184

Aloisio Araujo, Humberto Moreira and S. Vieira

Generic non-existence of general equilibrium with EUU preferences under extreme ambiguity pp. 185-191

Joao Correia-da-Silva

Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games pp. 192-202

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers pp. 203-210

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jacques Durieu and Sudipta Sarangi

Equilibria in a class of aggregative location games pp. 211-220

Tobias Harks and Max Klimm

Network games with incomplete information pp. 221-240

Joan de Martí Beltran and Yves Zenou

Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information pp. 241-245

E. Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Aner Sela and B. Shitovitz

Advertising a second-price auction pp. 246-252

Rui Fang and Xiaohu Li

Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions pp. 253-270

Isa Hafalir and Antonio Miralles

Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints pp. 271-275

Raouf Boucekkine, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti

Constrained efficiency without commitment pp. 276-286

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Yiannis Vailakis

Uniqueness of competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints under gross-substitution pp. 287-295

Gaetano Bloise and Alessandro Citanna

Ramsey equilibrium with liberal borrowing pp. 296-304

Robert Becker, Kirill Borissov and Ram Dubey

Fiscal policy, debt constraint and expectations-driven volatility pp. 305-316

Kazuo Nishimura, Thomas Seegmuller and Alain Venditti

Portfolio constraints, differences in beliefs and bubbles pp. 317-326

Florin Bidian