Journal of Mathematical Economics

1974 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atsushi (A.) Kajii

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Volume 62, issue C, 2016

The transfer paradox in welfare space pp. 1-4

Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock and Victor Ginsburgh

Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games pp. 5-18

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Credit segmentation in general equilibrium pp. 19-27

Sebastián Cea and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Likelihood relations and stochastic preferences pp. 28-35

Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong

Locally robust contracts for moral hazard pp. 36-51

Gabriel Carroll and Delong Meng

When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions pp. 52-61

Vinicius Carrasco, Paulo Orenstein and Pablo Salgado

Stochastic stability in assignment problems pp. 62-74

Bettina Klaus and Jonathan Newton

Risk neutrality regions pp. 75-89

Yakar Kannai, Larry Selden, Minwook Kang and Xiao Wei

Volume 61, issue C, 2015

Menu-dependent self-control pp. 1-20

Jawwad Noor and Norio Takeoka

Decomposing random mechanisms pp. 21-33

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver

Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games pp. 34-57

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Kern

Potential games with incomplete preferences pp. 58-66

Jaeok Park

New conditions for the existence of Radner equilibrium with infinitely many states pp. 67-73

Bogdan Klishchuk

Centralized allocation in multiple markets pp. 74-85

Daniel Monte and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity pp. 86-95

Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Random scheduling with deadlines under dichotomous preferences pp. 96-103

İbrahim Barış Esmerok

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core pp. 104-110

László Kóczy

A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule pp. 111-118

Juan Vidal-Puga

“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity pp. 119-129

Adam Dominiak and Jean-Philippe Lefort

Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes pp. 130-138

Eric Kamwa and Vincent Merlin

Intertemporal choice with different short-term and long-term discount factors pp. 139-143

Pavlo Blavatskyy

Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output pp. 144-151

Josep Freixas and Cameron Parker

Similarity-based mistakes in choice pp. 152-156

Fernando Payro Chew and Levent Ülkü

A nonsmooth approach to envelope theorems pp. 157-165

Olivier Morand, Kevin Reffett and Suchismita Tarafdar

The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing pp. 166-184

Aloisio Araujo, Humberto Moreira and S. Vieira

Generic non-existence of general equilibrium with EUU preferences under extreme ambiguity pp. 185-191

Joao Correia-da-Silva

Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games pp. 192-202

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers pp. 203-210

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jacques Durieu and Sudipta Sarangi

Equilibria in a class of aggregative location games pp. 211-220

Tobias Harks and Max Klimm

Network games with incomplete information pp. 221-240

Joan de Martí Beltran and Yves Zenou

Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information pp. 241-245

E. Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Aner Sela and B. Shitovitz

Advertising a second-price auction pp. 246-252

Rui Fang and Xiaohu Li

Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions pp. 253-270

Isa Hafalir and Antonio Miralles

Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints pp. 271-275

Raouf Boucekkine, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti

Constrained efficiency without commitment pp. 276-286

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Yiannis Vailakis

Uniqueness of competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints under gross-substitution pp. 287-295

Gaetano Bloise and Alessandro Citanna

Ramsey equilibrium with liberal borrowing pp. 296-304

Robert Becker, Kirill Borissov and Ram Dubey

Fiscal policy, debt constraint and expectations-driven volatility pp. 305-316

Kazuo Nishimura, Thomas Seegmuller and Alain Venditti

Portfolio constraints, differences in beliefs and bubbles pp. 317-326

Florin Bidian

Volume 60, issue C, 2015

On the modeling of size distributions when technologies are complex pp. 1-8

Jakub Growiec

On the existence of equilibria in games with arbitrary strategy spaces and preferences pp. 9-16

Guoqiang Tian

Threshold preferences and the environment pp. 17-27

Ingmar Schumacher and Benteng Zou

Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms pp. 28-32

Cristian Litan, Francisco Marhuenda and Peter Sudhölter

On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist pp. 33-42

Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens and Doh-Shin Jeon

Worst-case expected utility pp. 43-48

Shiri Alon

Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements? pp. 49-62

Xi Weng

Bargaining through Approval pp. 63-73

Matias Nuñez and Jean-François Laslier

Differentiability of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions pp. 74-80

Yutaka Nakamura

Stochastic models for risky choices: A comparison of different axiomatizations pp. 81-88

John K. Dagsvik

Quantum version of Aumann’s approach to common knowledge: Sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree pp. 89-104

Andrei Khrennikov

Nonstandard utilities for lexicographically decomposable orderings pp. 105-109

Davide Rizza

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games pp. 110-114

Rene van den Brink and Miklós Pintér

Costly information acquisition and the temporal resolution of uncertainty pp. 115-122

Daniele Pennesi

Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions pp. 123-133

Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games pp. 134-144

Mehmet Barlo and Guilherme Carmona

Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games pp. 145-158

Alan Beggs

Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel pp. 159-165

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal