Network games with incomplete information
Joan de Martí and
Yves Zenou ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 61, issue C, 221-240
We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.
Keywords: Social networks; Strategic complementarities; Bayesian games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Network Games with Incomplete Information (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:221-240
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