Network games with incomplete information

Joan de Martí Beltran and Yves Zenou
Additional contact information
Yves Zenou: GAINS - ARGUMANS - Atelier De Recherche En Gestion De L'université Du Mans - GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players' information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.

Date: 2015-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 61, pp.221-240. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Network games with incomplete information (2015)
Working Paper: Network Games with Incomplete Information (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04329656

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().