Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jacques Durieu and Sudipta Sarangi

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 61, issue C, 203-210

Abstract: In this paper we examine efficient networks in network formation games with global spillovers that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. Unlike the previous literature we impose these properties on individual payoff functions. We establish that efficient networks of this class of games are nested split graphs. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock (2010) on collaborative oligopoly networks.

Keywords: Networks; Efficiency; Convexity; Sub-modularity; Oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:203-210

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.019

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