Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers
Pascal Billand,
Christophe Bravard (),
Jacques Durieu () and
Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Jacques Durieu: CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2
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Abstract:
In this paper we examine efficient networks in network formation games with global spillovers that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. Unlike the previous literature we impose these properties on individual payoff functions. We establish that efficient networks of this class of games are nested split graphs. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock (2010) on collaborative oligopoly networks.
Keywords: Game Theory; networks; Efficiency; Convexity; Sub-modularity; Oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 61 (December), pp.203-210. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.019⟩
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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015) 
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015) 
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015) 
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01212128
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.019
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