Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard (), Jacques Durieu () and Sudipta Sarangi
Additional contact information
Christophe Bravard: Univ. Grenoble Alpes and INRA, UMR 1215 GAEL, F-38000 Grenoble, France ; CREG ; GATE Lyon St Etienne, F-69130 Ecully, France
Jacques Durieu: Univ. Grenoble Alpes and INRA, UMR 1215 GAEL, F-38000 Grenoble, France ; CREG ; GATE Lyon St Etienne, F-69130 Ecully, France

No 1537, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In this paper we examine efficient networks in network formation games with global spillovers that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. Unlike the previous literature we impose these properties on individual payoff functions. We establish that efficient networks of this class of games are nested split graphs. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock (2010) on collaborative oligopoly networks.

Keywords: networks; efficiency; convexity; sub-modularity; oligopolies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2015/1537.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1537

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