A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule

Juan Vidal-Puga

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 61, issue C, 111-118

Abstract: In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.

Keywords: Ordinal bargaining; Ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:111-118

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.008

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