Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

László Kóczy ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 61, issue C, 104-110

Abstract: We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the embedding coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive-balanced partition function form games we introduce a more permissive perfectness concept, subgame-consistency that only requires perfectness in selected subgames. Due to the externalities, the profitability of deviations depends on the partition formed by the remaining players: the stability of core payoff configurations is ensured by a combination of the pessimism of players going for certain profits only and the assumption that players base their stationary strategies on a made-up history punishing some of the possible deviators—and getting this sometimes right.

Keywords: Partition function; Externalities; Implementation; Recursive core; Stationary perfect equilibrium; Time consistent equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (2012)
Working Paper: Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (2012)
Working Paper: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (2009)
Working Paper: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (2009)
Working Paper: Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:104-110

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.006

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