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Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

László Kóczy ()

No 54365, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2009-10
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/54365/files/83-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:54365

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.54365

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