Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds

Tomoyuki Kamo and Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, vol. 63, issue C, 93-99

Abstract: This paper studies Arrovian preference aggregation rules–the rules satisfying weak Pareto and Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)–when individual preferences are nontransitive due to the existence of psychological thresholds — a problem of perceptible difference. A new domain replaces the universal domain, and rationality requirements of social preferences, i.e., transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity with indifference transitivity, are converted into the corresponding versions respectively. We show that the Arrovian impossibilities, i.e., dictator, oligarchy, and vetoer theorems, still survive in this setting.

Keywords: Arrovian social choice; Psychological thresholds; Intransitive indifference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:93-99

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.01.001

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