Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences

Ning Chen and Mengling Li

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, vol. 82, issue C, 272-284

Abstract: This paper studies the two-sided matching problem with multi-unit capacities and weak preferences on both sides. The simultaneous presence of these two features complicates the problem greatly, because either can make a stable matching not necessarily Pareto efficient. To ensure both fairness and efficiency, a natural solution is Pareto stability, which requires both pairwise stability and Pareto efficiency. We introduce a computationally efficient algorithm to construct a Pareto stable matching. This result immediately implies the existence of a Pareto stable matching in the general many-to-many matching problem with weak preferences.

Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Weak preferences; Pareto stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:272-284

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005

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