An axiomatic characterization of the price–money message mechanism for economies with satiation

Hiromi Murakami and Ken Urai

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, vol. 82, issue C, 264-271

Abstract: In this paper, we axiomatically characterize the price mechanism for economies including satiated agents. A path-breaking category-theoretic argument in Sonnenschein (1974) is generalized to include possibly satiated agents under a price mechanism with dividends or money. That is, the price–money mechanism is characterized uniquely and efficiently representing all other allocation mechanisms satisfying several basic axioms, including the weak core and Pareto properties. To obtain our generalization results, we use a replica rejective core limit theorem to dividend equilibria in Murakami and Urai (2017).

Keywords: Price mechanism; Satiation; Dividend equilibrium; Rejective core; Core limit theorem; Category theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:264-271

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.02.003

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