Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 79, issue C, 10-17
I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0,1]. These results are first obtained in a simple setting of ranking rules – where candidates are compared according to a ranking of their attributes – and are then extended to a more general setting of voting rules.
Keywords: Range voting; Evaluative voting; Utilitarianism; Measurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:10-17
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