Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting

Antonin Macé

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Abstract: I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0.1]. These results are first obtained in a simple setting of ranking rules – where candidates are compared according to a ranking of their attributes – and are then extended to a more general setting of voting rules.

Date: 2018-12
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, 79, pp.10-17. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002⟩

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Journal Article: Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting (2018)
Working Paper: Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02087667

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002

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