Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information

Anuj Bhowmik, Francesca Centrone and Anna Martellotti

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, vol. 84, issue C, 83-93

Abstract: We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Coalitional economies; Core-Walras equivalence; Finitely additive measure; Walrasian expectation equilibria; Private core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:p:83-93

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.003

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