Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information

Anuj Bhowmik, Francesca Centrone and Anna Martellotti

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon-Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. As a consequence, we also derive a new individualistic core-Walras equivalence result.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Coalitional economies; Core-Walras equivalence; Extremely desirable commodity; Finitely additive measure; Walrasian expectation equilibria; Private core; Radon-Nikodym property. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71084

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