On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting

Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar and Tal Patal

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 87, issue C, 128-133

Abstract: This study shows that independence between voters’ skills and states of nature improves the majority voting efficiency relative to the case when such independence does not exist. This implies that specialization (state of nature wise) is not advantageous under the simple majority rule.

Keywords: Simple majority rule; Specialization; CJT; Voting; Collective probability; Binary choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:87:y:2020:i:c:p:128-133

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.002

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