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Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 88, issue C, 31-41

Abstract: In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

Keywords: Cardinal mechanism design; Ordinal mechanism design; Incentive compatibility; Strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004

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