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Details about Arunava Sen

Homepage:http://www.isid.ac.in/~planning/asen.html
Workplace:Indian Statistical Institute, (more information at EDIRC)
Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Arunava Sen.

Last updated 2011-09-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pse157


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Working Papers

2010

  1. On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions
    Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics Downloads View citations (13)
  2. Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach
    Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India Downloads View citations (2)

2009

  1. Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals
    The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (13)
  2. Tops-Only Domains
    Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2011)

2007

  1. Ranking Completely Uncertain Decisions by the Uniform Expected Utility Criterion
    IDEP Working Papers, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France Downloads View citations (2)

2005

  1. Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes
    The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2007)

2004

  1. Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations (3)

2003

  1. Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes
    Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India Downloads View citations (4)

2002

  1. Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
    Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar
    Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads

1999

  1. Dictatorial domains
    CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Downloads View citations (8)
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2003)

1995

  1. Strategyproofness and Decomposability: Strict Orderning
    G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III View citations (1)
  2. Strategyproofness and decomposability: Weak Orderings
    G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III View citations (9)

1992

  1. Implementation in Generic Environments
    Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1996)

1991

  1. Nash Bargaining and the Cournot Theory of Oligopoly
    Working Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-

1990

  1. LAYOFF COMPENSATION AS COMMITMENT FOR ENTRY DETERRENCE
    Working Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-

Journal Articles

2011

  1. Tops-only domains
    Economic Theory, 2011, 46, (2), 255-282 Downloads View citations (24)
    See also Working Paper (2009)

2010

  1. Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35, (1), 29-48 Downloads View citations (5)

2007

  1. Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, (1), 163-179 Downloads View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper (2005)

2006

  1. Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27, (1), 175-187 Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
    Econometrica, 2006, 74, (4), 1109-1132 Downloads View citations (47)

2004

  1. Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
    Econometrica, 2004, 72, (2), 523-540 Downloads View citations (25)

2003

  1. Dictatorial domains
    Economic Theory, 2003, 22, (1), 45-62 Downloads View citations (32)
    See also Working Paper (1999)
  2. Limiting behaviour of Dickey-Fuller t-tests under the crash model alternative
    Econometrics Journal, 2003, 6, (2), 421-429 Downloads View citations (5)

2002

  1. Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106, (2), 392-416 Downloads View citations (17)

2001

  1. Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
    Economics Letters, 2001, 70, (3), 381-385 Downloads View citations (23)
  2. Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 101, (2), 374-394 Downloads View citations (40)
    See also Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394], Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 120, (2), 275-275 Downloads

1999

  1. Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
    Econometrica, 1999, 67, (3), 605-628 View citations (33)

1998

  1. Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 80, (2), 222-256 Downloads View citations (13)

1996

  1. Implementation in generic environments
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 467-478
    See also Working Paper (1992)
  2. Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 71, (1), 90-101 Downloads View citations (16)

1994

  1. 2-person Bayesian implementation
    Review of Economic Design, 1994, 1, (1), 41-54 Downloads View citations (3)
  2. Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 64, (1), 130-141 Downloads View citations (8)
  3. Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments
    Review of Economic Design, 1994, 1, (1), 173-203 Downloads View citations (40)
  4. Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 7, (1), 104-115 Downloads View citations (6)

1991

  1. Implementation under strong equilibrium: A complete characterization
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991, 20, (1), 49-67 Downloads View citations (23)
  2. Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
    Econometrica, 1991, 59, (4), 997-1021 Downloads View citations (79)

1990

  1. Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, 50, (2), 285-299 Downloads View citations (72)
 
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