Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms

Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

Keywords: incentive compatibility; cardinal utilities; ordinal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2016

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