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Random Dictatorship Domains

Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng
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Huaxia Zeng: Singapore Management University, Singapore.

No 27-2012, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy- proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity de ned on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not ran- dom dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition (introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dicta- torship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is a ramification result that shows that under certain assumptions, a domain that is a ran- dom dictatorship domain for two voters is also a random dictatorship domain for an arbitrary number of voters.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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