Tops-Only Domains

Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen

No 06-2009, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn ! A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2009-02
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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Journal Article: Tops-only domains (2011)
Working Paper: Tops-Only Domains (2009)
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