Dictatorial domains

Navin Aswal, Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 1, 45-62

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Social choice functions; Strategyproof; Dictatorship; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; Restricted domains.; JEL Classification Numbers: D71. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Working Paper: Dictatorial domains (1999)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8

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