Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers and Arunava Sen

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 229-243

Abstract: We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in Börgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops-inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented.

Keywords: Implementation in undominated strategies; Bounded mechanisms; Pareto correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:229-243

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010

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