EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Details about Eve Ramaekers

E-mail: This e-mail address is bad, please ask Eve Ramaekers to update the entry in the RePEc Author Service or the correct address.
Homepage:http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/~ramaekers
Workplace:Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Louvain Institute of Data Analysis and Modelling in Economics and Statistics (LIDAM), Université Catholique de Louvain (Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Eve Ramaekers.

Last updated 2014-02-10. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pra378


Jump to Journal Articles

Working Papers

2017

  1. Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
    LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Downloads View citations (14)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2017)

2013

  1. Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
    LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2013)

2010

  1. Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
    LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Downloads View citations (20)
    Also in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2008) Downloads View citations (3)

    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2010)
  2. Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents
    LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Downloads View citations (1)

2008

  1. An impossibility in sequencing problems
    Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Downloads

Journal Articles

2019

  1. Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, 180, (C), 229-243 Downloads View citations (1)

2017

  1. Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, (C), 613-631 Downloads View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper (2017)

2013

  1. Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (2), 359-380 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2013)

2010

  1. Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 68, (1), 220-232 Downloads View citations (20)
    See also Working Paper (2010)
 
Page updated 2023-01-31