Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents

Saptarshi Mukherjee (), Nozomu Muto () and Eve Ramaekers
Additional contact information
Saptarshi Mukherjee: Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, India
Nozomu Muto: Yokohama National University, Japan

No 2017011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does no result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism.

Keywords: Implementation in undominated strategies; Partial honesty; bounded mechanism; Pareto correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D4 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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