The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains

Abhishek Gaurav, Jérémy Picot and Arunava Sen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 28-34

Abstract: A feature of strategy-proof and efficient random social choice functions (RSCFs) defined over several important domains is that they are fixed probability distributions over deterministic strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions. We call such domains deterministic extreme point (DEP) domains. Examples of DEP domains are the domain of all strict preferences and the domain of single-peaked preferences. We show that the dichotomous domain introduced in Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) is not a DEP domain. We find a necessary condition for a strategy-proof RSCF to be written as a fixed probability distribution of deterministic strategy proof social choice functions. We show that this condition is compatible with efficiency. We also show that the condition is sufficient for decomposability in a special case.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489617300616
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:28-34

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.004

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().