Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
Fatma Aslan and
Jean Lainé ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 89, issue C, 66-78
We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley–Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.
Keywords: Shapley–Scarf markets; Competitive equilibrium; Couples; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:89:y:2020:i:c:p:66-78
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