Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Fatma Aslan and
Jean Lainé
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Abstract:
We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02613918
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002⟩
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Journal Article: Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02613918
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002
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