Details about Jean Lainé
Access statistics for papers by Jean Lainé.
Last updated 2025-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pla431
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Working Papers
2024
- Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
Post-Print, HAL
2023
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
Post-Print, HAL
See also Journal Article Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2023) (2023)
2022
- Compromise in combinatorial vote
Post-Print, HAL
See also Journal Article Compromise in combinatorial vote, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) (2022)
2021
- Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Post-Print, HAL
See also Journal Article Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2023) (2023)
- Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
Post-Print, HAL
See also Journal Article Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2021) View citations (1) (2021)
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
See also Journal Article When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2022) (2022)
2020
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Post-Print, HAL View citations (3)
See also Journal Article Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2020) View citations (3) (2020)
- Metrizable preferences over preferences
Post-Print, HAL
See also Journal Article Metrizable preferences over preferences, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2020) (2020)
2019
- Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting
Post-Print, HAL
2017
- Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2017) View citations (2) (2017)
- The strong referendum paradox
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
See also Journal Article The strong referendum paradox, Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
2016
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions
Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, HAL (2014) View citations (2)
See also Journal Article Hyper-stable social welfare functions, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2016) View citations (3) (2016)
2015
- Hyper-stable collective rankings
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Hyper-stable collective rankings, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2015) View citations (1) (2015)
- Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
2013
- Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox
Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University
- Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule
Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University 
See also Journal Article Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule, TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer (2014) (2014)
- Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox
Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University View citations (4)
See also Journal Article Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox, TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer (2013) View citations (4) (2013)
2006
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
Post-Print, HAL View citations (16)
See also Journal Article Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2006) View citations (17) (2006)
1999
- A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition
Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001), Department of Economics, Keele University
Journal Articles
2023
- Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Review of Economic Design, 2023, 27, (2), 469-469 
See also Working Paper Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) (2021)
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, 61, (2), 221-262 
See also Working Paper Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Post-Print (2023) (2023)
2022
- Compromise in combinatorial vote
Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 59, (1), 175-206 
See also Working Paper Compromise in combinatorial vote, Post-Print (2022) (2022)
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Review of Economic Design, 2022, 26, (3), 417-446 
See also Working Paper When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) View citations (1) (2021)
2021
- Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, 30, (1), 191-220 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Post-Print (2021) (2021)
2020
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 89, (C), 66-78 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples, Post-Print (2020) View citations (3) (2020)
- Metrizable preferences over preferences
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 55, (1), 177-191 
See also Working Paper Metrizable preferences over preferences, Post-Print (2020) (2020)
2017
- Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
Economics Letters, 2017, 161, (C), 105-107 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
- The strong referendum paradox
Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2017, 51, (4), 1707-1731 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper The strong referendum paradox, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
2016
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46, (1), 157-182 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Hyper-stable social welfare functions, Post-Print (2016) View citations (2) (2016)
2015
- Hyper-stable collective rankings
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 77, (C), 70-80 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Hyper-stable collective rankings, Post-Print (2015) View citations (1) (2015)
2014
- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2014, 22, (2), 784-799 
See also Working Paper Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule, Working Papers (2013) (2013)
2013
- Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2013, 21, (3), 590-611 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox, Working Papers (2013) View citations (4) (2013)
2012
- Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
Theory and Decision, 2012, 72, (4), 525-536 View citations (5)
- Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, 21, (4), 551-569
2011
- The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, (1), 60-67 View citations (6)
2009
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 32, (2), 317-333 View citations (8)
2008
- The Budget-Voting Paradox
Theory and Decision, 2008, 64, (4), 447-478 View citations (2)
2006
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2006, 52, (1), 49-66 View citations (17)
See also Working Paper Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox, Post-Print (2006) View citations (16) (2006)
2001
- Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste
Revue économique, 2001, 52, (7), 119-135 
Also in Revue Économique, 2001, 52, (1), 119-135 (2001) View citations (1)
2000
- Representation in majority tournaments
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000, 39, (1), 35-53 View citations (13)
1996
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (1), 75-93 View citations (34)
1993
- On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money
Ricerche Economiche, 1993, 47, (4), 363-383
1992
- On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game
Economics Letters, 1992, 38, (4), 399-403
1991
- Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies
Economics Letters, 1991, 35, (1), 1-4
Chapters
2010
- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
Springer
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