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Details about Jean Lainé

Workplace:Département Économie, Finance, Assurance, Banque (EFAB) (Department of Economics, Finance, Insurance and Banking), Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) (National Conservatory of Arts and Crafts), (more information at EDIRC)
Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies), İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jean Lainé.

Last updated 2025-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pla431


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Working Papers

2024

  1. Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
    Post-Print, HAL

2023

  1. Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2023) Downloads (2023)

2022

  1. Compromise in combinatorial vote
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article Compromise in combinatorial vote, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) Downloads (2022)

2021

  1. Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2023) Downloads (2023)
  2. Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2021) Downloads View citations (1) (2021)
  3. When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2022) Downloads (2022)

2020

  1. Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
    Post-Print, HAL Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2020) Downloads View citations (3) (2020)
  2. Metrizable preferences over preferences
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article Metrizable preferences over preferences, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2020) Downloads (2020)

2019

  1. Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting
    Post-Print, HAL

2017

  1. Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2017) Downloads View citations (2) (2017)
  2. The strong referendum paradox
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article The strong referendum paradox, Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer (2017) Downloads View citations (1) (2017)

2016

  1. Hyper-stable social welfare functions
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, HAL (2014) Downloads View citations (2)

    See also Journal Article Hyper-stable social welfare functions, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2016) Downloads View citations (3) (2016)

2015

  1. Hyper-stable collective rankings
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Hyper-stable collective rankings, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2015) Downloads View citations (1) (2015)
  2. Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)

2013

  1. Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox
    Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University Downloads
  2. Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule
    Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University Downloads
    See also Journal Article Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule, TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer (2014) Downloads (2014)
  3. Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox
    Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox, TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer (2013) Downloads View citations (4) (2013)

2006

  1. Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (16)
    See also Journal Article Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2006) Downloads View citations (17) (2006)

1999

  1. A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition
    Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001), Department of Economics, Keele University Downloads

Journal Articles

2023

  1. Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
    Review of Economic Design, 2023, 27, (2), 469-469 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) (2021)
  2. Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, 61, (2), 221-262 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Post-Print (2023) (2023)

2022

  1. Compromise in combinatorial vote
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 59, (1), 175-206 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Compromise in combinatorial vote, Post-Print (2022) (2022)
  2. When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
    Review of Economic Design, 2022, 26, (3), 417-446 Downloads
    See also Working Paper When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) View citations (1) (2021)

2021

  1. Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, 30, (1), 191-220 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Post-Print (2021) (2021)

2020

  1. Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 89, (C), 66-78 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples, Post-Print (2020) Downloads View citations (3) (2020)
  2. Metrizable preferences over preferences
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 55, (1), 177-191 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Metrizable preferences over preferences, Post-Print (2020) (2020)

2017

  1. Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
    Economics Letters, 2017, 161, (C), 105-107 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
  2. The strong referendum paradox
    Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2017, 51, (4), 1707-1731 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper The strong referendum paradox, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)

2016

  1. Hyper-stable social welfare functions
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46, (1), 157-182 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper Hyper-stable social welfare functions, Post-Print (2016) View citations (2) (2016)

2015

  1. Hyper-stable collective rankings
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 77, (C), 70-80 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Hyper-stable collective rankings, Post-Print (2015) View citations (1) (2015)

2014

  1. Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
    TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2014, 22, (2), 784-799 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule, Working Papers (2013) Downloads (2013)

2013

  1. Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox
    TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2013, 21, (3), 590-611 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox, Working Papers (2013) Downloads View citations (4) (2013)

2012

  1. Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
    Theory and Decision, 2012, 72, (4), 525-536 Downloads View citations (5)
  2. Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, 21, (4), 551-569 Downloads

2011

  1. The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, (1), 60-67 Downloads View citations (6)

2009

  1. Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 32, (2), 317-333 Downloads View citations (8)

2008

  1. The Budget-Voting Paradox
    Theory and Decision, 2008, 64, (4), 447-478 Downloads View citations (2)

2006

  1. Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2006, 52, (1), 49-66 Downloads View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox, Post-Print (2006) View citations (16) (2006)

2001

  1. Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste
    Revue économique, 2001, 52, (7), 119-135 Downloads
    Also in Revue Économique, 2001, 52, (1), 119-135 (2001) Downloads View citations (1)

2000

  1. Representation in majority tournaments
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000, 39, (1), 35-53 Downloads View citations (13)

1996

  1. Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (1), 75-93 Downloads View citations (34)

1993

  1. On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money
    Ricerche Economiche, 1993, 47, (4), 363-383 Downloads

1992

  1. On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game
    Economics Letters, 1992, 38, (4), 399-403 Downloads

1991

  1. Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies
    Economics Letters, 1991, 35, (1), 1-4 Downloads

Chapters

2010

  1. Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
    Springer
 
Page updated 2025-03-31