Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule

Gilbert Laffond () and Jean Lainé
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Gilbert Laffond: Laboratoire d'Econometrie, LIRSA

No 201303, Working Papers from Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University

Abstract: We define generalized (preference) domains D as subsets of the hypercube {− 1, 1 } D , where each of the D coordinates relates to a yes-no issue. Given a finite set of n individuals, a profile assigns each individual to an element of D . We prove that the outcome of issue-wise majority voting ϕ m belongs to D at any profile where ϕ m is well-defined if and only if this is true when ϕ m is applied to any profile involving only 3 elements of D . We call this property triple-consistency. We characterize the class of anonymous issue-wise voting rules that are triple-consistent, and give several interpretations of the result, each being related to a specific collective choice problem.

Keywords: Majority Rule; Triple Consistency; Multiple Elections; Stable Domains; Arrowian Aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2013-03
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http://repeck.bilgi.org.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscenter_2013_12_TripleCons.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule (2014)
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