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Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation

Hayrullah Dindar, Gilbert Laffond and Jean Lainé
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Gilbert Laffond: Murat Sertel Center - Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies - Istanbul Bilgi University

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Date: 2021-11-10
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Published in Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, 30 (1), pp.191-220. ⟨10.1007/s10726-020-09713-y⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03335595

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09713-y

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