Details about Hayrullah Dindar

Access statistics for papers by Hayrullah Dindar.

Last updated 2025-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pdi391

Working Papers

2024

1. Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
   Post-Print, HAL

2023

2. Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
   Post-Print, HAL
   See also Journal Article Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2023) (2023)

2022

3. Compromise in combinatorial vote
   Post-Print, HAL
   See also Journal Article Compromise in combinatorial vote, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) (2022)

2021

4. Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
   Post-Print, HAL
   See also Journal Article Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2023) (2023)
5. Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
   Post-Print, HAL
   See also Journal Article Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2021) View citations (1) (2021)
6. When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2022) (2022)

2019

7. Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting
   Post-Print, HAL

2017

8. Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2017) View citations (2) (2017)
9. The strong referendum paradox
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article The strong referendum paradox, Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer (2017) View citations (1) (2017)

2015

10. Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)

2013

11. Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox
    Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University

Journal Articles

2023

1. Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
   Review of Economic Design, 2023, 27, (2), 469-469
   See also Working Paper Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) (2021)
2. Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, 61, (2), 221-262
   See also Working Paper Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, Post-Print (2023) (2023)

2022

3. Compromise in combinatorial vote
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 59, (1), 175-206
   See also Working Paper Compromise in combinatorial vote, Post-Print (2022) (2022)
4. When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
   Review of Economic Design, 2022, 26, (3), 417-446
   See also Working Paper When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?, Post-Print (2021) View citations (1) (2021)

2021

5. Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
   Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, 30, (1), 191-220 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation, Post-Print (2021) (2021)

2017

6. Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
   Economics Letters, 2017, 161, (C), 105-107 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
7. The strong referendum paradox
   Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2017, 51, (4), 1707-1731 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper The strong referendum paradox, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)